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ABSTRACT: The innocent days of the Atoms for Peace program vanished with the suicide attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York City that occurred while the GLOBAL 2001 international nuclear fuel cycle conference was 
convened in Paris. Today’s reality is that maintaining an inventory of unirradiated highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium for critical experiments requires a facility to accept substantial security cost and intrusion. In the context of 
a large collection of benchmark integral experiments collected over several decades and the ongoing rapid advances in 
computer modeling and simulation, there seems to be ample incentive to reduce both the number of facilities and 
material inventory quantities worldwide. As a result of ongoing nonproliferation initiatives, there are viable programs 
that will accept highly enriched uranium for down blending into commercial fuel. Nevertheless, there are formidable 
hurdles to overcome before national institutions will voluntarily give up existing nuclear research capabilities. 
GLOBAL 2005 was the appropriate forum to begin fostering a new spirit of cooperation that could lead to improved 
international security and better use of precious research and development resources, while ensuring access to existing 
and future critical experiment data. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
From the 1950’s through the 1970’s there were dozens of 
critical facilities put into operation around the world. 
However beginning in 1980’s, the number of facilities in 
active use began to declined. Depending on location, 
materials inventory and security infrastructure, some of these 
facilities now represent a proliferation vulnerability. 
This issue has languished as the international community has 
grappled with more immediate concerns. Nevertheless, this 
large stockpile of unirradiated highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium would represent a serious global threat if some of it 
were acquired by a terrorist network. Diversion from one 
country could put all countries at risk. There are only two 
acceptable options: continue to invest in escalating security 
measures or ship the inventory to a secure site. 
Even though there is a cost incentive to reduce the number of 
critical facilities worldwide, there are also major hurdles to 
implementing the concept. Here we examine some of those 
hurdles and ways to overcome them. Because highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) is much more broadly distributed and 
represents the greater proliferation threat, we focus our 
remarks on the beneficial elimination of unnecessary HEU. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the scope of the problem, it is helpful 
to know something about critical facilities—how they are 
constructed, what the materials are like, what assemblies have 
been tested, what the future needs are likely to be. 
1. Critical Facilities 101 
Although there are some specialty facilities with relatively 
fixed geometry and composition, most critical facilities are 
designed to be flexible enough to be able to mock up a variety 
of reactor designs. Materials are fabricated in the form of 
small plates, disks or rods, which are mixed in the optimum 
proportion to produce the desired composition. When all the 
materials are assembled in the critical array, the core is 
operated up to a very low power (typically less than 1000 
watts), but usually in a subcritical mode (>95% of time). As a 
result, even the fuel remains relatively cold, readily handled 
without tools and shielding most of the time.
Because it offers the maximum flexibility, HEU has typically 
been the fuel of choice. By mixing HEU plates with depleted 
uranium plates, any core zone enrichment can be 
approximated. A typical loading of critical experiment 
materials is shown in Figure 1 for both plate and pin 
geometries.
Fig. 1. Typical fast critical materials and arrangement 
2. Is HEU Really Needed? 
Historically HEU was used in some test reactors, gas-cooled 
reactors and some fast-spectrum reactors. With the success of 
the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor 
(RERTR) program2, new test reactor designs are using 
low-enriched uranium. Similarly, all proposed gas-cooled 
power reactor designs have been based on low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) for the past several years. Depending on size, 
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new fast-spectrum reactor designs such as those for 
irradiation facilities could require HEU. Nevertheless, many 
of these experiments could be performed with a lower grade 
of HEU (e.g. 35% vs. 95% 235U) Long-lived “nuclear battery” 
concepts3 such as the Toshiba 4S design have taken LEU as a 
design criterion. With renewed interest in large science and 
human exploration, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) is expected eventually to pursue 
research on fission systems to provide station power and 
propulsion. HEU is expected to be used in these systems 
because of weight limitationsthe trade-off between reactor 
weight and cargo load.
Recently several countries with advanced nuclear energy 
programs have begun to discuss plans to focus research on 
sodium-cooled fast reactors capable of using fuel comprised 
of transuranics recycled from spent nuclear fuel.4 [GNEP 
REF] Any future critical experiments for these systems will 
likely require plutonium as a base fuel rather than HEU.  
3. Need for Future Critical Experiments 
With the world poised on the brink of international 
development of Generation-IV reactors and a new generation 
of space reactor designs, now is an opportune time to consider 
sharing historical and future integral physics data that could 
bear on these systems. Critical experiment data have 
traditionally been used to validate new reactor designs and 
their safety characteristics—a requirement that will not likely 
change for the next generation of advanced reactors. 
However, data already exist from hundreds of critical 
assemblies covering the range of most materials of interest, 
notwithstanding minor actinides. Newer experiments have 
sometimes re-plowed old ground and have occasionally been 
poorly inadequately planned. New analysis tools could be 
developed that would eliminate the need for many future
experiments as well as improve the planning for new 
measurements.  
Critical facilities also have a role in preparing new 
generations of reactor physicists and criticality safety 
specialists. However, it seems unlikely that role requires the 
use of HEU. 
III. INCENTIVES FOR CONSOLIDATION 
There are multiple drivers for considering a consolidation of 
integral physics data programs for advanced reactor 
development. The underlying goals that should motivate 
international cooperation are cost reductions and measurable 
progress on global nonproliferation activities. The enabling 
factors in considering such a plan at this time are: 
x The Generation-IV framework for international 
cooperation 
x A wealth of excellent existing benchmark data 
relevant to advanced designs 
x The emergence of new techniques for effectively 
using a broad spectrum of integral data to reduce 
design margins and improve confidence in safety 
and performance 
x The rapid progress of advanced computing, 
modeling and simulation 
x Global threat reduction initiatives to reduce 
inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 
plutonium 
x The reemergence of the United States as a leader in 
advanced nuclear technology development 
1. More Money to Research, Less to Security 
In the United States at least, it costs far more to secure the 
fissile material than it does to operate a critical facility for a 
year, including all the measurements and analysis. Investment 
in physical security upgrades are costing as much as 10 times 
more than the original facility construction cost. Although the 
situation is somewhat different unique in every country, if 
similar comparable security investments upgrades are not 
being made for other facilities, the international community 
has reason to question the adequacy of safeguards measures. 
Clearly if the a facility’s operation are is not required for 
national programs, serious considerations should be given to 
disposition of HEU and/or decommissioning of the critical 
facility. 
2. The Generation-IV International Forum 
The Generation-IV International Forum has established a 
framework for international cooperation in the development 
of advanced reactor systems4systems5. Few, if any, of the 
proposed systems would require HEU, even for startup cores. 
The relatively few required mockup assemblies could be 
handled in a minimum number of internationally accessible, 
but highly secure facilities. 
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Fig. 2. A large plutonium core in the JUPITER Program 
There is a long history of international cooperation and 
participation in such programs as exemplified by the 
Japan-US series of JUPITER programs in the 1980’s that 
provided the definitive integral data for large sodium-cooled 
fast reactors. Some of these experiments have since been 
analyzed by scientists from other countries. The US had 
similar cooperative programs with France and the United 
Kingdom. 
3. Thousands of Documented Experiments 
Global sharing of benchmark criticality data is already a 
reality. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark 
Evaluation Project (ICSBEP)5 6 has compiled criticality data 
for more than 3000some 3800 configurations and distributed 
the evaluations to 59 60 countries. Much of the emphasis of 
this program has been on preserving data that would have 
been otherwise lost. It would be a natural extension to make 
future experiments broadly available to the international 
community within an appropriate framework such as ICSBEP 
or the Generation-IV International Forum. 
4. New Tools for Using Existing Experiments 
The key to successfully reducing the required number of 
critical experiments is the development of a set of analytical 
tools that can effectively use the accumulated data bases of 
integral measurements and criticality benchmarks. Such tools 
have been considered for more than two decades6decades7,
but have not been developed for systematic application to 
advanced reactor design. Emerging techniques7 techniques8
promise to be adaptable to fully utilizing modern computing 
capabilities toward achieving this end. Further, sensitivity 
analysis techniques can (and should) be used to design and 
validate experiments. 
The effectiveness of this analytical approach has already been 
demonstrated by some incomplete work at Argonne National 
Laboratory8Laboratory9. For uranium-fueled experiments, it 
was shown that the predicted criticality was vastly improved 
by taking into consideration a whole array of uranium 
benchmark experiments. Further, there was little 
improvement by adding a new experiment to the collection, 
even when that experiment represented a faithful geometric 
and compositional mockup. 
5. Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
In 2004 President Bush announced a new global threat 
reduction initiative that was quickly embraced by the IAEA. 
One of the tenets of this initiative is to “work to convert the 
cores of civilian research reactors that use high enriched 
uranium to use low enriched uranium fuel, throughout the 
world.” 9 10 Although most of the related effort has been 
directed through the RERTR Program at test reactors that use 
HEU fuel, the need to secure unirradiated critical facility fuel 
is equally as great. 
Even in the United States, Department of Energy sites are 
divesting themselves of excess fissile material that is no 
longer needed by current programs, actions driven primarily 
by the escalating cost of security requirements. With the 
implementation of the BLEU Program10Program11, the US 
now has an effective HEU disposition program for taking 
“off-spec” material and down blending it to 5% enrichment 
for acceptable commercial reactor use. 
Recognizing the need to effectively manage security costs, 
the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has disposed of almost 
three tons of fissile material, including some 600 kg of HEU 
critical experiment fuel plates. The INL plans to dispose an 
additional eight tons of HEU as resources become available 
over the next several years. Nevertheless, the Laboratory will 
continue to maintain a smaller inventory of well-protected 
HEU for various nuclear energy and national security 
programs. The latter includes development and testing of 
systems to detect illicit smuggling of HEU. 
6. Reassertion of the US as Nuclear Technology Leader 
In 1998 the US nuclear research budget sank to zero. By 
contrast, in 2005 the US Department of Energy created a new 
lead nuclear energy laboratory—The Idaho National 
Laboratory. The Bush Administration has strongly urged 
construction of new nuclear power plants for reasons of 
energy security and environmental protection. More than 
two-thirds of all Americans favor the construction of new 
plants. The nuclear energy research budget is supporting 
currently installed reactors, Generation-IV and the Advanced 
Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI)new power plant construction, 
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and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Nonproliferation 
activities are beginning to focus more on the civilian fuel 
cycle. 
As a part of its nuclear revitalization, the Department of 
Energy is consideringmay consider whether to upgrade and 
restart the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) which is 
uniquely suited to supporting large international programs 
requiring the use of plutonium fuel. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The future need for plutonium or HEU fuel to support design 
and licensing activities will be primarily limited to advanced 
fast reactors. A very small number of facilities in highly 
secure locations would be adequate to support global needs if 
a robust international framework were established. Each of 
the required elements of such an approach is relatively well 
developed. Putting these elements together in a 
comprehensive international program would improve both 
the quality of design and international security. The 
GLOBAL series of conferences was created to foster a bold 
view of our nuclear future. Simultaneously achieving better 
physics results and global security is a vision worth 
considering. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author thanks Prof. Frank von Hippel for suggesting this 
topic; Prof. Paul Turinsky for updating him on modern 
sensitivity analysis techniques, and his colleagues Steven 
Aumeier, Robert Schaefer and Peter Collins for their 
consultation and advice. 
NOMENCLATURE 
BLEU: Blended Low Enriched Uranium
GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium (>20% 235U)
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICSBEP: International Criticality Safety Benchmark 
Evaluation Project 
INL: Idaho National Laboratory 
JUPITER: Japan-US Program of Integral Tests and 
Experimental Research 
LEU: Low Enriched Uranium (<20% 235U)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
RERTR: Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor 
ZPPR: Zero Power Physics Reactor 
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